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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The first issue dealt with in this paper pertains to the distribution of flexible labour
across the various countries of the EU, comparing the results of the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) with the 1996 Labour Force Survey. Next, time
measures of longitudinal employment were used, whereby the focus was particularly
on the transitions between the various longitudinal employment statuses. The
employment statuses were called employment profiles because they picture the
employment history over a 36-month period of observation. An empirical model was
developed to explain the transitions between these statuses and various regression
models were estimated using the ECHP data. We were particularly interested in
transitions from insecure employment and partial exclusion into secure employment
or full exclusion. 
Extending on Esping-Andersen’s typology, European countries are clustered in four
ideal-typical regimes: a liberal, social-democratic, corporatist and southern regime.
Both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, this clustering seems to make sense.
It appears that the share of flexible labour is much higher in the Southern countries.
Next, looking at the distribution of employment profiles across the regime types, it was
found that mobility from partial exclusion and insecure jobs into secure and permanent
jobs is higher in the liberal and social-democratic countries than in the South. On the
other hand, permanent employment appears to be more stable in Southern countries.
The opposite holds for flexible jobs being more fragile in the South. Both results might
be due to the high level of employment protection regulation in the Southern region.
Overall, remarkable stability with respect to permanent employment was observed.
More than 85 per cent of the permanent workers remained in their job between 1993
and 1995. On the other hand, there is substantial mobility between secure and insecure
jobs. The image of a segmented labour market with secure jobs on the one side and
flexible, insecure jobs on the other is far from reality in either employment regime. The
closer the attachment to the labour market, the higher the income is for the various
status groups compared to the people in secure employment. Next, looking at
transitions from one longitudinal employment profile into another, confirms our
previous results. Upward mobility is higher in the liberal and social-democratic
countries and lower in the South. In addition, downward mobility is higher in the
South. The Southern regime is, therefore, performing worse in terms of enhancing job
mobility and preventing labour market exclusion.
  
§ This paper was written in the framework of the EXSPRO project ‘Social exclusion
and social protection. The future role for the EU’. The EXSPRO research project was
funded by the European Commission under the Targeted Socio-Economic Research
programme. The author would like to express his gratitude to DG Research of the
European Commission for its support. Additional information on the EXSPRO project
can be obtained from the website:http://www.sbu.ac.uk/euroinst/EXSPRO/index.html.
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Abstract
Using longitudinal information on labour market participation we analyse the
dynamics of unemployment in Europe. We focus in particular on individuals
with a poor attachment to the labour market. The countries under scrutiny are
clustered into four ideal-typical welfare regimes. Overall, a remarkable
stability with respect to permanent employment is observed. But on the other
end, there also is a substantial mobility between secure en insecure jobs.
Nevertheless, mobility from insecure employment to secure employment is
found to be larger in liberal and social-democratic countries than in Southern
Europe.
Keywords: labour market exclusion, labour market dynamics, insecure
employment, ECHP
JEL-codes: E24, J64, J68
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1 Working profiles and changing concepts of work
The concepts of work are changing. Life-time employment, meaning working
40 hours a week for 50 weeks a year over a 40-year period often with the
same or a limited number of employers, is losing ground in favour of more
flexible and diverse patterns of life-time employment. European economic
and monetary integration will give a further impetus to the upswing of the
process of increasing mobility and turnover on the labour market.
The rise of atypical work and non-standard contracts reflects the need of
firms to adapt quickly to rapidly changing market conditions. These market
changes are emerging particularly form developments in information and
communication technologies. The notion of the ‘flexible firm’ implies that
the adaptability of firms as far as personnel management is concerned, is
partly also established by the creation of core and peripheral workers
segments. The existence of these two segments does not necessarily imply
that there is no or little mobility between them. On the contrary, for
theoretical as well as empirical reasons it might be true that the mobility
within and between the two segments is rather high and, therefore, overall
labour turnover might even rise. Images of segmentation  and dynamics are
two sides of the same coin. Some individuals within the peripheral group of
workers might move quickly into permanent jobs while others keep
wandering around in the lower strata of the labour market. But neither are
core workers deemed to stay in the same jobs; on the contrary ‘job-hopping’
might be a better strategy to raise one’s long-term career prospects or
permanent income than staying with the same employer.
Quite a few individuals belonging to the better strata of the labour market
might experience rapid moves from one job to another either within the firm
or in the external labour market. Whether this is actually the case for all
workers might be questionable, but the image of a world with large
segmentation and hardly any mobility is far from reality. The concept of a
‘transitional labour market’ might gain importance in current labour markets.
This implies that for a rather large portion of society, working life becomes a
continuing sequence of short employment and unemployment spells. Lifetime
employment with the same employer, although still the reality for many
workers, will increasingly be unattainable for many new entrants to the
labour market. This leaves aside the fact that modern workers are likely to be
unwilling to stay with the same firm for their entire career due to changes in
labour and leisure preferences (Muffels, 2000).
The aim of this paper is to acquire a deeper insight into these flows on the
labour market and the factors that might be responsible for the great
variations in these employment patterns between individuals and households
both within and across countries. The focus will be especially on patterns of
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partial employment according to the attachment of the person to the labour
market in a given period of time. These employment patterns are called
working profiles and it is claimed that these profiles provide a better insight
into modern labour markets because of their focus on the dynamics or
changes of employment and unemployment status over time. The attachment
to the labour market over a certain time and particularly the length of the
intermittent periods of withdrawal from the labour market determine the
extent to which people are in full or partial employment and therewith,
whether they are fully or partially included.
Then, in a dynamic perspective, labour market exclusion refers to
longitudinal employment patterns over time with intermittent periods of
unemployment, disability or, even, early retirement. These intermittent
periods of withdrawal constitute cases of exclusion only in so far as these are
enforced due to collective layoffs, disability or retirement. If they are the
result of free will, as might be true for temporary jobs or part-time
employment, it is not justified to speak of exclusion because people prefer
these jobs for their shorter working hours or for rendering more leisure time.
With increasing age, in many cases a forced retreat from the labour market
can be observed due to retirement, redundancy or collective layoffs.
Therefore, labour market exclusion in terms of enforced idleness might apply
to the long-term unemployed, those seeking work but not able to get the job
they want, the underemployed who work less than they want and the disabled
and senior workers who are not expected to work. However, there is little
information in the ECHP data about whether the exclusion is due to enforced
idleness or free will and preferences for leisure1. Especially for female and
older workers this neglect of the unforced or forced nature of exclusion might
lead to an over-estimation of the extent of exclusion. There is not much we
can do here except to be cautious about drawing far-reaching conclusions on
the extent of labour market exclusion. Therefore, when we use the term
‘exclusion’ it is in an non-normative, positive sense, meaning that the
excluded do not take part in the labour market, without suggesting that it is
enforced idleness that makes them ‘excluded’.
Definitions of Longitudinal (Un)employment
The ECHP has only been running for a short period of time, from 1994
onwards, and to date only the data for the first three waves of 1994 to 1996
are available. In looking at the transitions on the labour market, the paper
                                                                
1 There is some information on the number of hours people want to work for the reference week,
the week just before the date of interview, but not on the number of annual hours people want to
work. However, that is the kind of information needed if the idea is to use the monthly calendar
information to determine longitudinal work profiles.
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only deals with information over 36 months of observation. Nevertheless, at
the European level, three years seem sufficient to observe various transitions
from steady jobs into marginal employment and vice versa, and from one
longitudinal employment status into the other. Considering the relatively
short observation period in the mid-nineties, it cannot be ruled out that the
mobility patterns we observe are influenced by differences in the business
cycle across countries. At the time of observation, however, all countries
under scrutiny were in the same (upward) phase of the business cycle.
The focus in this paper is on longitudinal employment and unemployment
patterns. The ECHP provides information on the activity status of the
respondent for each month in the calendar year prior to the interview date.
The activity status variable is then transferred to a longitudinal activity status
variable called ‘main status’, i.e. the most frequent status observed on a
monthly basis over the 36 months of observation. The frequency of monthly
status, then, determines whether people are employed, unemployed or
inactive over the 36-month period (usual status). In addition to the ‘usual
status’, everyone whose main status is ‘not working’ in a particular month has
been treated as being unemployed. Therefore, in this approach people are
considered inactive only when they were not working during all of the 36-
month period, i.e. not working all of the time.
2 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is the individual within the household. The research
subject involves the unemployment profile of the person but it is assumed
that this individual profile is affected by the social and economic situation of
the household, which, in turn, means the labour market and financial situation
of the individual household members. Implicitly, it is therewith assumed that
although individualisation patterns are widespread, the household is still the
economic unit within which important decisions with respect to labour supply
are jointly made. In our empirical models, information on the household is,
therefore, included to take account of the role of the family with regard to
employment decisions. Only the adults of working age are considered in the
analyses.
Work insecurity has been defined as a weak attachment to the labour
market in a longitudinal sense (working less than 50% of the potential 36-
month working period). Because the observation period is rather short, only
short work patterns can be observed. If the time horizon could be extended,
working patterns might change.
To say that if people are working less than 50% of the potential working
time over a three-year period they are work-insecure does not imply that they
consider themselves to be, or feel, work-insecure. The subjective work-
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security status also depends on their preferences for work; i.e. the number of
months and hours they actually want to work. In the ECHP there is some
information on whether people are looking for a job and for how many hours.
It is not known how many months during a year they really want to work and
for what reasons they want to work less than the full 12 months. In future
research the issue of how these labour supply variables might affect the
outcomes of our analyses will certainly be tackled.
3 Employment Regimes and Flexible Labour
Comparative research into the labour market should take account of the
evidence that stocks and flows on the labour market are affected not only by
the demographic and economic situation at the country level but also by
cross-national institutional differences reflected in labour market policies and
social security designs. Looking at the national settings it appears that there is
great variety in goals, objectives, tools, institutions and policies. Despite this
variety, the idea that these systems cluster one way or another in a limited set
of welfare and employment regimes is well-known in the literature. These
regimes represent different ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen,
1990, 1996, 1999), each being internally tightly integrated, and each being
sharply differentiated from one another (Goodin et al., 1999). Each welfare
state is, of course, uniquely defined by its own logic in terms of institutional
set-up, policy design, and functioning but as suggested by Esping-Andersen
also clusters around some distinct ‘ideal-typical’ regime type. His typology
was criticised by authors like Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli
(1997) for his neglect of what they called a Southern or ‘Latin-Rim’ model of
the welfare state. They argued that the Southern, Mediterranean countries
belong to a different welfare regime type with its familial characteristics and
its immature and selective social security system granting poor benefits and
lacking a guaranteed minimum benefit system. Esping-Andersen admitted in
his later work (1996) that the Southern countries share some Catholic and
familial traditions but do not form a specific type or group of countries, but
were merely underdeveloped forms of the traditional Corporatist type (Arts
and Gelissen, 1999).
This issue will not be elaborated further here, since the data limitations
confine us within the level of detailed analysis. The ECHP data cover
transitional data for a period of three years only and since a number of
country samples are small in size like Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Greece and Ireland, there is a lack of sufficient transitions to
conduct detailed analyses. Since the ECHP data contain information on the
Southern European countries, it is feasible to test whether the Southern labour
markets show an essentially distinct pattern. One could opt for a regional
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classification into Northern, Central European and Southern European
countries. Apart from the lack of theoretical underpinnings for such a
distinction, its disadvantage is also that the UK, Ireland and the Nordic
countries like Denmark and Finland would be classified under the same
heading. According to Esping-Andersen’s classification of liberal,
conservative-corporatist and social-democratic countries (1990) the UK and
Ireland, as liberal welfare states in an ‘ideal-typical’sense, should be set apart
from the Nordic (Denmark and Finland; the ECHP does not contain any
information on Norway or Sweden yet) and continental social-democratic
welfare states (Netherlands). The classification of Ireland under the liberal
heading by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) is, however, rather doubtful.
Considering a range of labour market indicators, it only shares the liberal
feature of a low level of employment protection regulation. Looking at the
other labour market indicators it seems to share the corporatist feature of an
active labour market policy and the corporatist ‘breadwinner’s state’
characteristic of a low female employment rate. In terms of familial
characteristics, it shares the typical features of a Southern welfare state.
Ireland should, therefore, be considered as part of a hybrid  type of welfare
state that does not fit into any of the  ‘ideal-typical’ welfare states. In order to
avoid the inclusion of Ireland as the only example of a hybrid type it was
decided to keep it under the same liberal heading as the UK and to test, using
the three-wave European panel-data, whether that makes sense empirically.
For that reason it was decided to use an amended version of Esping-
Andersen’s classification. The UK and Ireland remain under the liberal
heading, notwithstanding our reservations for Ireland, but the Southern
welfare states are set apart as a distinct regime (Arts and Gelissen, 1999;
Goodin et al., 1999). Countries like Germany, Belgium, France, Austria and
Luxembourg belong to a continental corporatist type of welfare state and the
Netherlands and the Nordic welfare regimes are classified under the social-
democratic regime heading. The Southern regime cluster includes Spain,
Portugal, Greece and Italy.2 Since our analyses involve the labour market
performance of these welfare regimes, we will use the term employment
regime instead of welfare regime.
4 Temporary Employment and Flexible Labour Contracts
There is some evidence (European Commission, 1999; OECD, 1999) that the
Southern labour markets are indeed quite different from the labour markets in
                                                                
2 To test the reliability of this classification, the empirical model for partial exclusion in Section 6
(see Table 6) has been estimated using country dummies instead of ‘employment regime’
dummies. It emerges that the model including the employment regime dummies ‘captures’ 97%
of the variance of the model with country dummies.
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Northern and Central Europe  in some respects (employment regulation,
unemployment level, share of non-standard jobs or flexible labour, share of
informal economy). This can be shown when the distribution of non-standard
and temporary employment is looked at across a number of European
countries.3 In Table 1 the figures on the distribution of temporary, casual and
other types of non-standard employment are depicted for 1996, the latest year
for which we have information.
Looking at the figures for non-standard, flexible employment it is not
surprising that the largest share of flexible labour is found in countries with
the highest level of employment protection regulation i.e. the Southern
countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy.
Remarkably, though, Ireland also has a high level of flexible employment
despite a low level of employment regulation. Smaller but still sizeable
figures are found in the Northern countries, such as Denmark and Finland.
Much smaller numbers are found in Luxembourg.4 Countries like France, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have sizeable levels of atypical
employment, which are in between the numbers for the Southern and the
Northern European countries. Nevertheless, they have average or low levels
of employment regulation. The Northern countries, in common with some
Southern countries, share the fact that ‘casual work and other arrangements’
are quite large. In Italy and Portugal these two job types account for 40% of
all flexible jobs and in Greece even for 70%. In the United Kingdom and
Ireland its share is about 50% and in the Netherlands 70% (particularly
temporary agency and on-call contracts). It emerges that, except for Spain,
countries with large numbers of atypical jobs have large numbers of these
very ‘typical’ jobs like temporary agency work, on-call contracts, zero-hours
contracts, labour pool jobs, freelance jobs, housework and the like. The
welfare state classification does not provide much added value to the figures
for the different countries. It appears that the liberal, social-democratic and
corporatist regime types are very similar in terms of the relative size of the
flexible workforce, whereas we would expect the highest level in corporatist
and social-democratic countries. The highest levels are, indeed, found in the
Southern regimes in which one in five employees has a flexible job.
                                                                
3 The Netherlands is included in the analyses although the Dutch data do not contain calendar
information on the employment statuses over time on a monthly basis. However, using the
information on the number of months people are in particular statuses it appeared feasible from
these ‘count data’ to construct the longitudinal employment status variable indicating the number
of months people are in employment or unemployment over the year (by giving precedence to
work over unemployment and inactivity).
4 Figures for Luxembourg should be taken with caution because the number of observations is
extremely small.
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In Table 1 the figures from the ECHP 1996 are also compared with the
Labour Force Survey 1996 figures.5 The picture that comes out of the ECHP
is not very dissimilar to the one that comes out of the LFS. A rather broad
definition of flexible labour is also used in the LFS, including temporary jobs,
temporary agency work, casual work and the like. The LFS figures provide
identical rankings except for a few countries where remarkable and
unexpected differences occur, such as for Ireland and Greece. The countries
showing the largest difference according to the LFS figures are also countries
with high shares of ‘casual jobs and other arrangements’. If we leave out this
flex-job type, we find that the ECHP figures are generally lower than the LFS
figures. Therefore, it appears that the LFS includes some, but certainly not
all, of the jobs being included in the ‘casual jobs and other arrangements’
category within the ECHP (see also Meulders et al., 1994; Bosch, 1995;
Delsen, 1995).
                                                                
5 The LFS figures include all types of temporary jobs like fixed term contracts, temporary agency
work, casual work and on-call contracts.
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Table 1: Proportion of people of working age in permanent and non-standard
jobs, by category, country and regime type, 1996 (figures for the total adult
population 16 years and older in employment)
Perma-
nent job
Tempo-
rary job
Casual
work
Other
arrange-
ments
Total
flexible
jobs
Flexible
jobs
(LFS)
Belgium 88.6 9.2 0.8 1.4 11.4 6
Denmark 85.7 6.4 7.3 0.7 14.4 11
Germany 87.5 6.7 2.4 3.4 12.5 11
Greece 76.6 7.9 14.5 1.0 23.4 11
Spain 63.4 29.9 4.2 2.5 36.6 34
France 90.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 13
Ireland 81.5 6.1 9.7 2.7 18.5 9
Italy 87.5 7.6 2.8 2.1 12.5 8
Luxembourg 93.6 3.4 1.8 1.2 6.4 3
Netherlands 89.9 3.1 0.6 6.4 10.1 12
Austria 88.6 5.8 0.8 4.9 11.4 8
Portugal 81.3 11.2 3.7 3.8 18.7 10
Finland 84.7 12.4 1.9 1.1 15.3 17
UK 87.5 5.8 4.1 2.7 12.5 7
Sweden - - - - - 12
Europe 14 85.6 9.2 2.7 2.5 14.4 121)
Non-European countries
United States2) - - - - - 2.2
Canada3) - - - - - 8.8
Japan4) - - - - - 10.4
Employment regime
Liberal 87.2 5.8 4.3 2.7 12.8 -
Social Demo. 88.0 5.5 2.4 4.1 12.0 -
Corporatist 88.5 7.9 1.4 2.2 11.5 -
Southern 77.4 15.9 4.4 2.3 22.6 -
1) Figures for Europe for 15 countries including Sweden
2) Source OECD Employment Outlook 1996 (figures of February 1995)
3) Figures for 1994 for the age group 15–24
4) The age group is 15–19
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1996.
‘ Insecure’ Jobs
The number of workers in non-standard employment is one indicator of a
loose attachment to the labour market but a rather static one. Longitudinal
measures of flexibility or insecurity are preferable but here the data limit the
sort of analyses that can be conducted. Because of a lack of information on
the type of contract in the first wave of the ECHP, it only appeared possible
to look at the changes across the second and third waves. In Table 2 the
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transitions between the various working statuses between 1995 and 1996 are
presented.
The stability in working status across both years is largest for the people
in permanent jobs and in unemployment or non-participation. About 9 out of
10 people remained employed or not working across both years. Mobility is
largest for people in atypical jobs like a temporary or casual job. Only 43% of
the people in a temporary job remained in that job the year after and almost
30% moved into unemployment or out of the labour force. No less than a
quarter of people in temporary jobs moved into a permanent job the next
year. The mobility into permanent jobs is highest for the ‘other arrangements’
type of jobs. Almost half of them, 45%, were capable of moving into a
permanent job the year after.
Table 2: Transition rates of employment status between 1995 and 1996 in
Europe1)
Employment
status
PE TC CW OA NW Total
PE 89.1 1.8 0.8 1.2 7.2 100
TC 25.5 42.7 1.6 2.7 27.7 100
CW 25.1 6.6 27.7 7.3 33.4 100
OA 45.7 7.0 3.3 23.8 20.2 100
NW 6.6 2.9 0.9 0.5 89.1 100
Europe 39.0 4.2 1.2 1.1 55.5 100
PE = permanent employment; TC = temporary contract; CW =  casual work; OA =
other arrangement; NW = not working (unemployed or non-participant).
1) Excluding Finland
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1995-1996
In all employment regimes stability appears highest for the people in
permanent jobs and for people not working at all during the two-year period
(the table is reporduced in the appendix). The differences in job stability
across the regimes are insignificant whereas the position of the non-working
people is most stable in the Southern regime. Non-working people obviously
have fewer chances to move into employment in the Southern regime than
they have in the other regime types.
Compared to other employment regimes, non-working people in the
social-democratic welfare states have the highest chances of getting a job.
About a quarter of them found a job in the two-year period between 1995 and
1996, and the great majority of these jobs were permanent jobs. The
corporatist and liberal welfare states perform worse in this perspective,
contradicting our previous expectations. The hesitations we had in classifying
these countries as liberal seem to find some ground in the data. Looking at the
mobility patterns of people in temporary jobs it is shown that they are more
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likely to move into permanent jobs in the liberal countries than they do in the
social-democratic and corporatist countries. The Southern regime performs
worse in getting workers from non-standard jobs into permanent jobs,
although it has the largest share of flexible jobs. For this reason and because
of the worse employment situation in Southern countries, only one in five
people in a temporary job moved into a permanent job two years later;
whereas it was one in three people in the liberal regimes. The same pattern is
found for casual jobs and partly also for the ‘other arrangements’ category,
although the corporatist regime performs better for both types of jobs in terms
of mobility rates into permanent jobs than the social-democratic regime. The
differences are quite large, especially for the ‘other arrangements’ category.
Almost 60% of the people in this type of job found a permanent job within
two years in the corporatist countries but only 30% in the Southern countries.
5 Labour Market Attachment and Regime Type
A more challenging way to look at work insecurity and weak attachment to
the labour market is in the use of longitudinal information on employment
and unemployment. On an annual basis, the degree of attachment to the
labour market is measured by counting the number of months people are in
employment or unemployment during the 12-month period. For a long-term
perspective, the same is done for the three years of data at our disposal. The
long-term labour market attachment is defined in accordance with the number
of months the respondents were employed during the 36-month period (cf.
Table 3).6 The employment status of the person is labelled insecure when a
person is partially employed and the proportion of time spent in employment
during the observation period is below 100%. People are in secure
employment  when the proportion of time spent in employment is 100% or, in
other words, when they have worked all the time. The labels of ‘partial’ and
‘full’ exclusion from the labour market are assigned to situations where the
proportion of time spent in employment are, respectively, less than 50% and
equal to 0%.
                                                                
6 Because, in the ECHP, only the 1995 and 1996 waves of data are available for Austria and 1996
for Finland, for these countries no employment profile could be computed for the missing years.
No calendar information is available for the Netherlands. The information on the number of
months worked was matched from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, which is the dataset used in
the ECHP for the Netherlands.
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Table 3:Longitudinal definitions of employment/unemployment
Proportion of time spent in
Employment/ unemployment
Definition of longitudinal
employment state
0% Fully excluded
0-50% Partially excluded
50-99% Partially employed (work insecure)
100% Fully employed (work secure)
Table 4 depicts the longitudinal employment profiles computed from the 36
months of information. About 58% of the working-age people in all countries
are fully (44%) or partially (14%) employed, whereas about 41% are partially
(11%) or fully (30%) excluded from the labour market. Hence, more than one
in four persons in Europe is experiencing precarious employment conditions
over the 3-year period (partially employed or partially excluded).
It might be expected that the longitudinal attachment to the labour market
would be weaker in Southern countries due to higher levels of unemployment
compared to the social-democratic and corporatist countries. If the evidence
for the various employment regimes is examined, it indeed seems true that the
number of people not working due to long-term persistence of unemployment
(for a consecutive period of 36 months) or being persistently out of the labour
force is substantially higher (41% against 23% in the social-democratic
countries).
Table 4:Proportion of persons of working age by longitudinal employment
status, 1993-1995 (36 months)1)
Fully
employed
(work
secure)
Partially
employed
(work
insecure)
Partially
excluded
Fully
excluded
Total
Europe 44.2 14.2 11.4 30.2 100
Liberal 47.1 17.5 11.8 23.6 100
Social-democratic 47.7 16.8 12.9 22.6 100
Corporatist 48.7 14.6 10.4 26.3 100
Southern 35.9 11.4 12.1 40.6 100
1) For Austria and Finland the variable is defined over the last 24 and 12 months,
respectively
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1994–1996.
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6 Upward and Downward Mobility by Regime Type
In Table 5 transition matrices for the employment status between 1993 and
1995 are presented. The percentages on the diagonal of the transition matrix
show that there is a good deal of stability in the labour market position of
workers and job seekers. Most of the workers in secure employment stayed in
secure employment over the three years (87%). This evidence should be of
concern for policy-makers because when regimes do manage to get people
from insecure into secure jobs, it is likely that people stay in these stable jobs
for a long time. Overall mobility from one state into the other is rather
substantial. A closer look shows that it is not only upward mobility that is
high in Europe but downward mobility as well. For the partially employed
(work insecure) the findings show that about 50% were capable of moving
into secure employment in the period. At the same time almost half of them
(50%) were not and either stayed in insecure employment (21%) for the next
36 months or moved into full exclusion from the labour market (29%). The
evidence for these weakly employed people shows that the labour market
prospects for them are mixed. For half of them the prospects are good while
for the other half they are rather bad because their attachment to the labour
market is gradually declining and in the final stage they become fully
excluded from the labour market.
Overall, the conclusion might be that there is a large segment in the labour
market for which the employment opportunities are rather good, even after
being employed in precarious jobs, whereas a sizeable segment lives in
steadily worsening labour market conditions. It is certainly not true that once
people have unstable jobs, they have few chances of moving into stable jobs.
This challenges the view that the labour market is segregated into tracks of
stable or secure jobs and unstable, insecure jobs between which there is little
mobility. On the other hand there is quite some persistence in inclusion as
well as exclusion in the labour market, indicating that the images of high
labour turnover and a sizeable amount of labour market exclusion are indeed
two sides of the same coin in modern labour markets (Verma et al., 1999;
Muffels and Steijn, 1999).
The number of persistently employed is much lower in the South (36%
against 49% in the corporatist countries in Central Europe). Security of
employment is lower in the Southern region and, hence, the attachment to the
labour market is weaker. However, unexpectedly, the prevalence of
precarious employment (partially employed + partially excluded) is higher in
the liberal and social-democratic countries at 30%, as opposed to 23% in the
South. The continental corporatist countries are in between. There seems to
be more instability in the longitudinal working status of people who are
partially employed or partially excluded from the labour market. On the other
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hand the findings show that (1) full employment over time is equally stable in
the liberal, social-democratic and corporatist countries and slightly less stable
in the South and (2) that full exclusion from the labour market, due to lack of
employment, is more prevalent in Southern countries.
Table 5:Proportion of persons moving between employment status between
1993 (12 months) and 1995 (12 months) by regime type (in percentages of all
persons belonging to the category in 1993)1)
Regime type Fully
employed
(work
secure)
Partially
employed
(work
insecure)
Partially
excluded
Fully
excluded
Total
Europe
Fully employed 86.8 4.3 1.7 7.2 100
Partially employed 50.4 14.8 6.3 28.5 100
Partially excluded 41.3 14.6 11.8 32.3 100
Fully excluded 10.5 3.7 4.8 81.1 100
Liberal
Fully employed 86.6 5.4 1.8 6.2 100
Partially employed 58.9 9.9 3.8 27.4 100
Partially excluded 46.5 16.3 7.9 29.4 100
Fully excluded 13.2 5.5 6.1 75.2 100
Social-democratic
Fully employed 87.6 5.1 2.2 5.1 100
Partially employed 45.7 24.9 8.7 20.7 100
Partially excluded 40.5 17.5 13.6 28.4 100
Fully excluded 12.1 6.2 7.2 74.5 100
Corporatist
Fully employed 87.9 4.0 1.6 6.5 100
Partially employed 52.1 14.4 6.1 27.5 100
Partially excluded 47.8 14.4 7.9 30.0 100
Fully excluded 12.0 4.0 5.0 79.1 100
Southern
Fully employed 85.0 3.7 1.7 9.6 100
Partially employed 41.6 16.6 8.1 33.6 100
Partially excluded 28.4 13.0 19.6 39.0 100
Fully excluded 8.0 2.5 3.8 85.7 100
1) Excluding Finland and Austria
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1994, 1996.
The evidence on precarious employment is therefore different from what was
found earlier with respect to flexible labour being more prevalent in Southern
countries. The Southern countries seem to have a different employment
record compared to the other countries because they have less stable
employment, less unstable employment but more stable unemployment. From
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other sources it is known that the Southern states are characterised by strong
employment regulations (OECD, 1999), less active labour market policies
and high unemployment rates due to lower economic growth rates. The
number of people in employment is generally lower, as is employment
growth. This might point to a different type of employment regime.
Subsistence security is not attained in Southern welfare states by a
generous welfare system as in the social democratic regime, or in a highly
flexible, efficiently operating labour market with low unemployment rates, as
in the liberal regime, but by a highly regulated labour market with
employment security. Employment security seems to be attained at the
expense of a less efficiently operating labour market, because of which such a
regime has to accept high levels of unemployment and inactivity. The picture
emerging from the welfare state type of classification is that the Southern
employment regime appears to be quite distinct from the continental
corporatist and social-democratic regimes in the North. However, the liberal
regime type is hardly distinguishable from the continental corporatist one.
The liberal type certainly has less employment regulation but the share of
temporary employment is substantial and larger than one might expect in a
liberal regime where there is no need to attain flexibility through temporary
jobs, since flexibility is innately achieved by a low level of employment
protection and prevailing firm practices with respect to layoffs and quits in
situations of demand cuts.
The evidence found here, that the number of people with a weak
attachment to the labour market appears lower in the Southern countries, does
not mean that the labour market performs better. People need not stay
unemployed for shorter periods in these regimes nor do they have more
chances for escaping from precarious employment. Due to the lower
economic and employment growth in the Southern countries the chances of
moving upwards on the job ladder into permanent jobs is likely to be smaller
than in the other European countries. To examine this issue further, the
transition probabilities of moving upwards or downwards on the job ladder
across the various countries are analysed.
To what extent the employment regime is capable of guaranteeing that
people move from partial or insecure employment into secure employment
should be an important indicator for the labour market performance of
welfare states. The upshot for these employment regimes is to what extent
they permit people in partial employment or partial exclusion to escape from
these precarious jobs and to move upwards into better, more secure jobs.
The transitions across the three years by regime cluster are depicted in
Table 5. In liberal, social-democratic and corporatist states people in full,
secure employment in 1993 have slightly higher chances of remaining in
stable jobs in 1994 than they have in Southern Europe. The findings show
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that in the South more people in full or secure employment are likely to move
into full exclusion from the labour market the following year (10%, as
opposed to 5-6%). Furthermore, partially employed and partially excluded
people have much higher chances of escaping from unstable and moving into
stable jobs in the liberal, corporatist and social-democratic states than people
have in the Southern region. The Southern people with partial or insecure
labour records in 1993 have much lower probabilities of getting out of that
situation and moving into secure jobs. About 42% of the people in insecure
jobs in the South are capable of moving upwards on the job ladder into stable
jobs against 60% in the liberal states, 52% in the social-democratic countries
and 46% in the corporatist countries (the European average is 50%). Further,
the proportion of people moving from partial employment into full exclusion
is still higher in Southern countries than in the other regions (34% in the
South against 21% in the social-democratic countries and 28% in the liberal
and corporatist countries). The conclusion must be that upward mobility is
lower in Southern Europe and downward mobility higher. From a review of
the evidence on the labour market performance of these employment regimes,
it might be concluded that the Southern regime is performing worse in terms
of enhancing job mobility and preventing labour market exclusion. What the
reasons for these differences are, apart from differences in employment
protection legislation, is left for further scrutiny.
In the next section, this issue is examined by estimating explanatory
models for explaining why some people are more likely to be work secure
whereas others are more likely to be excluded from the labour market. Two
types of models were estimated, (1) a model which explores the probability of
belonging to any employment status (as defined on the 36 months of
observation) and (2) a transition model exploring the changes in 12-month
employment status between the first and last year.
Determinants of Longitudinal Employment Status
First we model the probability of belonging to one of the longitudinal
employment status for the 36-month period. Results are given in Table 6. We
contend that having a particular status is likely to be not the result of a
random walk but affected by what happened before the observation date. We
therefore posit the existence of a selection effect for which we need some
correction procedure. Previous work and unemployment history are therefore
added to the model and our hunch is that they will affect the likelihood of
belonging to the work insecure. The people having an unstable work history
in the 36 months prior to the interview in 1996 will be more likely to occupy
an insecure job in 1996 than people with a stable work history. We also
included a life satisfaction score, since life satisfaction is expected to be at
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least partly the result of the current living situation and partly the result of
what happened in the past. The variable is meant to capture part of the
selection effect, though we could presume that the satisfaction score is a
personal trait and that holding a more positive attitude towards life provides
better chances in the labour market. The inclusion of age and age squared
should measure the labour market opportunities by age as well as the
declining labour force participation at higher ages. The human capital
variables are included to take account of the differences in labour market
opportunities by education level (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1993). Further, we
contend that these human capital variables play a role in the outcomes of the
search process for a better job. Our conjecture is that people not satisfied with
their current job due to being in a temporary or insecure work contract or
being lowly paid, search for a better job. Better educated people are more
likely to be successful in getting their preferred job. This hypothesis follows
the well-known ‘job search’ theoretical approach (e.g. Lipmann and McCall,
1986; Mortensen, 1986; Narendranathan and Nickell, 1986). We also contend
that the change in labour market position over time might also depend on the
‘job search’ efforts of the individual.
The dummies for having capital or social transfer income are incorporated
in the model to capture the ‘incentives-to-work’ effect. We include regional
variables to account for the effect of differences in employment policies or
employment regimes. The variables are measured at the beginning of the
observation period (wave 1).
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Table 6:Estimation results of the multinomial model for explaining the
belonging to the longitudinal employment status groups, 1993-1995 (36
months), Beta coefficients (reference group: partial exclusion)1)
Fully employed
(work secure)
Partially employed
(work insecure)
Fully Excluded
Male Reference Reference Reference
Female -1.019** -0.456** 0.795**
Age 0.475** 0.141** -0.081**
Age squared -0.006** -0.002** 0.002**
Low education level -0.249** -0.056** 0.051*
Average education level Reference Reference Reference
High education level 0.273** 0.350** -0.551**
Number of children -0.079** -0.075** 0.199**
Household size -0.140** -0.100** 0.077**
Single Reference Reference Reference
Couple no child -0.176 -0.020 -0.141*
Couple with child(ren) -0.016** -0.166** 0.068
Lone parent 0.058 -0.541** 0.210**
Other 0.002 0.220** -0.408**
Never married Reference Reference Reference
Married 0.539** 0.340** -0.303**
Separated 0.469** 0.297** -0.315**
Widow(er) 1.047** 0.394** -0.419**
Life satisfaction 0.100** 0.024 0.047**
No capital income Reference Reference Reference
Capital income 0.417** 0.264** -0.356**
No social transfer income Reference Reference Reference
Social transfer income -1.914** -0.498** -0.100**
Liberal Reference Reference Reference
Social democratic -0.539** -0.263** -0.162**
Corporatist -0.011 0.019 -0.044
Southern -0.669** -0.573** 0.516**
Constant -7.047** -1.504** 0.095
N = 77,856; Pseudo R2 = 0.220 (model with counrty dummies: Pseudo R2 = 0.223)
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level
1) For Austria and Finland the variable is defined over the last 24 and 12 months,
respectively
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1994–1996.
People with higher levels of education and those who are married have higher
chances of being fully or partially employed and lower chances of being fully
excluded. The odds of being partially or fully employed rather than partially
excluded decrease when the person’s household has more children or when
the household lives in a country with a social democratic or Southern
employment regime. Living in the South and having more children also
increases the relative probability of being fully excluded. Women face a
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greater risk than men of being fully excluded, while older workers and people
living in countries with a social democratic employment regime are less
likely to belong to the fully excluded. A better life satisfaction score favours
being in secure employment. The effect of having social security income is
ambiguous as it significantly reduces the probability of being work secure
(disincentive effect) but it also decreases the probability of full exclusion.
Transitions in Longitudinal Employment Status
The use of the monthly calendar information permits us to look at changes in
the longitudinal employment status between the first 12 months of
observation at wave 1 and the last 12 months at wave 3. In modelling the
transitions from one longitudinal status into another it is assumed that the
explanatory model can by and large use the same sort of variables as in the
previous model. Except, we now have the possibility of introducing some
measures for the changes in household formation across the years. The
multinomial model is aimed at explaining the transitions in employment
status. If the status variable consists of four categories (secure, insecure,
partially excluded and fully excluded), 16 types of transitions can be
distinguished. Since our interest goes especially to transitions from partial
exclusion to any other status, the set of statuses to be considered can be
limited to three. The model7 has, thus, been estimated for three sorts of
transition: (1) a transition from partial exclusion into secure employment, (2)
a transition from partial exclusion into insecure employment and thirdly a
transition from partial exclusion into full exclusion. The results of estimation
are given in Table 7.
The models for explaining change generally have a lower fit than the
cross-sectional models. There are various reasons for this: technical ones such
as a low number of transitions, measurement error and attrition but also more
substantial ones such as lack of information on the time varying variables that
might explain the transitions from one longitudinal employment status into
another. For the explanatory variables, information is available at the start of
the observation period but not at the start of the transition. Nevertheless, the
model presented here shows a reasonable good fit. The reference group is the
group of persons not moving and staying in marginal employment or partial
exclusion.
The same kind of variables appear important for explaining the transition
from partial exclusion into secure employment as in the model for partial
                                                                
7 This time we estimated a multinomial model for the likelihood of making a transition between
wave 1 and wave 3 (instead of belonging to a certain category as in the previous cross-sectional
model).
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exclusion (Table 6). Age has a positive effect and age squared a negative
effect8. Education level has the expected positive sign. A lower education
level diminishes the chances of making a transition into a secure job. The
same holds for the number of children. The variable, job search, has –
contrary to our expectations– a negative sign indicating that the more one
searches, the less likely he/she is to experience a transition into a secure job.
Further inquiry into the reasons for this is needed. It might be that people in
insecure jobs are not searching for a permanent job but prefer a non-standard
job allowing them to combine working and caring duties, which is less
feasible in a permanent job, because of long working hours. The employment
regime variables appear to have a strong effect on the likelihood of a
transition. The transition probabilities are larger in the North and lower in the
South. The effects have different signs but they are also stronger in the South.
Hence, there is less mobility across employment status in the Southern
region, corroborating our earlier results. The results for the other types of
transition are more or less similar.
For the transition from marginal employment into insecure employment,
separation exerts a strong negative effect on the transition into insecure
employment. For the transition from partial into full exclusion the signs of the
personal variables are the reverse of the signs for the other cases. But for
education level, separation and job search the signs are in an equal direction.
The lower educated have lower chances of moving into full exclusion than
those who are separated. People searching more, have lower chances to move
from marginal employment into full exclusion. The findings for the regional
variables show that, contrary to what we had expected, the chances of moving
out of the labour force are higher in the Northern region. The dummy for the
South appears insignificant.
                                                                
8 The point at the age curve where the positive effect of age reaches its maximum is 31 years for
transitions from partial exclusion to full-time work and 37 years for transitions from partial
exclusion into insecure employment.
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Table 7:Multinomial model for transitions out of partial employment
(Finland and Austria are not included; reference group: stayers PEàPE)
PEàFE PEàPEX PEàFEX
Male Reference Reference Reference
Female 0.032 0.204 0.553**
Age 0.018 -0.013 -0.241**
Age squared -0.001 0.000 0.004**
Low education level -0.036 0.012 -0.170
Average education level Reference Reference Reference
High education level 0.649** 0.409* -0.241
Number of children -0.248** -0.208* -0.046
Household size -0.104 -0.041 0.041
Single Reference Reference Reference
Couple no child 0.263 0.657 0.148
Couple with child(ren) -0.035 0.237 0.116
Lone parent -0.008 0.873 0.913*
Other 0.382 0.744* -0.540
Never married Reference Reference Reference
Married 0.801** 0.502* 0.112
Separated 0.596 0.114 0.203
Widow(er) 2.773 1.079** 1.135
Life satisfaction 0.052** -0.006 -0.007
No capital income Reference Reference Reference
Capital income -0.152 -0.080 0.014
No social transfer income Reference Reference Reference
Social transfer income -0.693** -0.302* -0.306*
Liberal Reference Reference Reference
Social democratic -0.852** -0.458 -0.641**
Corporatist -0.104 -0.212 -0.068
Southern -1.520** -1.236** -0.405*
Changes from wave1 to wave3
No change Reference Reference Reference
Married 0.680** 0.121 0.342
Separated 0.001 0.846 1.165**
More children -0.208 -0.114 0.125
Less children -0.475 -0.721* -0.636*
More adults 0.580* 0.811** 0.302
Less adults -0.121 -0.090 -0.203
Constant 1.613* 0.825 4.712**
N = 2,928, Pseudo R2 = 0.112
FE=full employment; PE=partial employment; PEX=partial exclusion; FEX=full
exclusion
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1994, 1996.
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7 Conclusions and Discussion
The first issue dealt with in this paper pertains to the distribution of flexible
labour across the various countries of the EU, comparing the results of the
ECHP with the 1996 Labour Force Survey. Next, time measures of
longitudinal employment were used, whereby the focus was particularly on
the transitions between the various longitudinal employment statuses. The
employment statuses were called employment profiles because they picture
the employment history over a 36-month period of observation. An empirical
model was developed to explain the transitions between these statuses and
various multinomial regression models were estimated using the ECHP data.
We were particularly interested in transitions from insecure employment and
partial exclusion into secure employment or full exclusion.
Existing cross-sectional statistics showed clearly that the labour markets
across the various countries are rather different in terms of unemployment
levels, extent of regulation, share of flexible labour, employment growth and
share of the informal economy. Therefore, our purpose was to examine
whether the use of longitudinal information would change the comparative
picture substantially. Because of the short length of the observation period,
particularly in the smaller countries, quite low numbers of transitions in terms
of longitudinal employment status were observed. Partly due to this and
theoretical reasons explained before, it was decided to cluster the countries
into the four ‘ideal-typical’ classification derived from Esping-Andersen and
others.
Looking at the figures on flexible labour across the various countries a
first test was obtained about whether the Southern countries should be
considered a separate welfare state or employment regime or should be
considered part of the corporatist type. It appeared that the share of flexible
labour is indeed very much higher in the Southern countries. Next, looking at
the distribution of employment profiles across the regime types, it was found
that mobility from partial exclusion and insecure jobs into secure and
permanent jobs is higher in the liberal and social-democratic countries than in
the South. On the other hand, permanent employment appears to be more
stable in Southern countries. The opposite holds for flexible jobs being more
fragile in the South. Both results might be due to the high level of
employment protection regulation in the Southern region. The employment
opportunities in the South to escape unemployment are generally fewer.
Overall, remarkable stability with respect to permanent employment was
observed. More than 85% of the permanent workers remained in their job
between 1993 and 1995. On the other hand, there is substantial mobility
between secure and insecure jobs. The image of a segmented labour market
with secure jobs on the one side and flexible, insecure jobs on the other is far
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from reality in either employment regime. The closer the attachment to the
labour market, the higher the income is for the various status groups
compared to the people in secure employment. Next, looking at transitions
from one longitudinal employment profile into another, confirms our
previous results. Upward mobility is higher in the liberal and social-
democratic countries and lower in the South. In addition, downward mobility
is higher in the South. The Southern regime is, therefore, performing worse in
terms of enhancing job mobility and preventing labour market exclusion.
Although we only had three waves for analysing transitions across the
various employment regime types, the results so far reported in this paper
show remarkable differences across the three distinct ‘ideal-types’ of
employment regimes. The analyses certainly need longer time-series to arrive
at conclusions that are more robust, but the results are sufficiently
encouraging to continue with this dynamic approach of testing regime-type
differences using these excellent panel surveys.
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Appendix
Transition rate of employment status between 1995 and 1996 by employment
regime1)
PE TC CW OA NW Total
Liberal
PE 88.7 2.1 0.8 1.3 7.3 100
TC 32.2 39.0 3.2 2.2 23.4 100
CW 28.8 3.5 26.9 3.4 37.4 100
OA 43.4 5.0 3.2 21.5 26.9 100
NW 8.6 1.7 2.5 0.8 86.4 100
Total 46.2 3.1 2.3 1.4 47.1 100
Social Democratic
PE 91.8 0.7 0.6 1.5 5.5 100
TC 27.4 32.1 6.6 10.1 23.8 100
CW 22.8 11.9 34.8 3.3 27.4 100
OA 36.2 6.3 1.5 32.6 23.5 100
NW 19.3 3.1 0.9 1.4 75.4 100
Total 46.0 2.9 1.3 2.2 47.7 100
Corporatist
PE 89.6 1.6 0.7 1.2 6.9 100
TC 27.5 39.2 0.3 2.1 30.9 100
CW 33.0 1.6 26.6 13.8 25.1 100
OA 58.2 3.9 2.1 23.6 12.2 100
NW 6.7 3.5 0.3 0.3 89.2 100
Total 45.3 4.1 0.7 1.1 48.8 100
Southern
PE 87.3 2.6 1.1 0.8 8.3 100
TC 21.0 48.3 2.2 2.8 25.8 100
CW 15.7 12.4 28.2 5.7 37.9 100
OA 31.3 15.4 7.1 21.7 24.6 100
NW 3.4 2.8 0.9 0.3 92.5 100
Total 25.4 5.2 1.4 0.8 67.2 100
PE = permanent employment; TC = temporary contract; CW = casual work; OA =
other arrangement; NW = not working (unemployed or non-participant).
1) Excluding Finland
Source: EUROSTAT, ECHP 1995-1996.
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